The objective of our paper is to capture and integrate the systematic differences inperformance between independent ventures (IVs), established by individual entrepreneurs,and corporate ventures (CVs), set up by larger companies, in a simple model. We assume thatthe two players, which are bound by a contract, are the managers of the parent company andof the CV respectively. We assume that the managers of both the CV and the parentcompany have some form of access to the firm's profit p. The manager of the parentcompany derives some benefits from interfering with the activities of the CV (b(l)), whichputs the latter at a disadvantage. But he also incurs costs through transferring valuableresources such as reputation, brand image, credit at interest rates below market rates or simplepecuniary transfers etc., to the CV (t). We analyse different cases of a CV's "cost-benefit"-account from belonging to a parent company. This can range from a substantial deficit(l*>t*) to a positive contribution (t**>l**). In the latter case, the CV can outcompete the IVby combining the full flexibility of strategic and tactical freedom with the benefit ofbelonging to a parent company, e.g. by using a well-known brandname
