The Shapley value analyzed under the Felsenthal and Machover bargaining model
Year of publication: |
2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bernardi, Giulia ; Freixas, Josep |
Other Persons: | Felsenthal, Dan S. (contributor) ; Machover, Moshé (contributor) |
Published in: |
Public choice. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0048-5829, ZDB-ID 207597-0. - Vol. 176.2018, 3/4, p. 557-565
|
Subject: | Cooperative games | Simple games | Shapley value | Bargaining procedures | Roll-calls | Shapley-Wert | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Theorie | Theory | Transferierbarer Nutzen | Transferable utility |
-
Fair allocation in crowd-sourced systems
Assif, Mishal, (2023)
-
Pipeline power : a case study of strategic network investments ; conference paper
Hubert, Franz, (2014)
-
Kohlberg, Elon, (2021)
- More ...
-
An axiomatization for two power indices for (3,2)-simple games
Bernardi, Giulia, (2019)
-
Models and Reality: the Curios Case of the Absent Abstention
Felsenthal, Dan S., (2002)
-
Annexations and alliances: When are blocs advantageous a priori?
Felsenthal, Dan S., (2002)
- More ...