The Shapley Value and Average Convex Games.
In this paper we reformulate the necessary and sufficient conditions for the Shapley value to lie in the core of the game. Two new classes of games, which strictly include convex games, are introduced: average convex games and partially average convex games. Partially average convex games, which need not be superadditive, include average convex games. The Shapley value of a game for both classes is in the core. Some Cobb Douglas production games with increasing returns to scale turn out to be average convex games. The paper concludes with a comparison between the new classes of games introduced and some previous extensions of the convexity notion.
Year of publication: |
1993
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Authors: | Inarra, Elena ; Usategui, Jose M |
Published in: |
International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 22.1993, 1, p. 13-29
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
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