The stationary equilibrium of three-person coalitional bargaining games with random proposers : a classification
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Okada, Akira |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 43.2014, 4, p. 953-973
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Subject: | Non-cooperative bargaining | Coalitional game | Three-person game | Random proposer | Core | Marginal contribution | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Koalition | Coalition | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game |
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