The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations

In the many-to-one matching model with contracts, I show that there is no restriction on preferences weaker than substitutable preferences which guarantees that the set of stable allocations is a lattice. Thus, when contracts are not substitutes, removing agents from the economy may decrease the payoffs to existing agents on both sides of the market.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Flanagan, Francis X.
Published in:	Journal of Mathematical Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068. - Vol. 53.2014, C, p. 106-110
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Matching with contracts \| Many-to-one matching \| Stability \| Lattice

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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