The Suspension of Preliminary Injunctions in Brazil : An Example of Institutional Corruption

The concept of institutional corruption can be used to identify any possible procedural practice, within or outside the government, capable of distorting the missions of that institution. The distortion may be broad or narrow, compromise the whole or a part, and affect some members or every member of the institution. The goal of this paper is to scrutinize a specific feature of Brazilian Civil Procedure, the so-called “Suspensão de Liminar,” in which the presidents of the court of appeals and of the other major courts of the country have the power to, in an individual decision, inhibit the effects of injunctions granted by the trial judges against the government. It is argued the presidents of the state court of appeals are too close to governors and mayors; that the courts are reluctant to rule against the government for fear of their own interests being compromised; and that this results in distorted judicial outcomes which favor the government, to the detriment of private parties