The Tempered Aspirations solution for bargaining problems with a reference point
Gupta and Livne (1988) modified Nash’s (1950) original bargaining problem through the introduction of a reference point restricted to lie in the bargaining set. Additionally, they characterized a solution concept for this augmented bargaining problem. We propose and axiomatically characterize a new solution concept for bargaining problems with a reference point: the Tempered Aspirations solution. In Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975), aspirations are given by the so called ideal or utopia point. In our setting, however, the salience of the reference point mutes or tempers the negotiators’ aspirations. Thus, our solution is defined to be the maximal feasible point on the line segment joining the modified aspirations and disagreement vectors. The Tempered Aspirations solution can be understood as a “dual” version of the Gupta–Livne solution or, alternatively, as a version of Chun and Thomson’s (1992) Proportional solution in which the claims point is endogenous. We also conduct an extensive axiomatic analysis comparing the Gupta–Livne to our Tempered Aspirations solution.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Balakrishnan, P.V. ; Gómez, Juan Camilo ; Vohra, Rakesh V. |
Published in: |
Mathematical Social Sciences. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896. - Vol. 62.2011, 3, p. 144-150
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
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