The use of cash flows metrics in CEO compensation and the design of loan contracts
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gong, Guojin ; Jiang, Xin Daniel ; Xie, Biqin |
Subject: | agency cost of debt | cash-flow-based covenant | cash-flow-based performance evaluation | executive compensation | loan contract design | loan spread | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Vertrag | Contract | Cash Flow | Cash flow | Kredit | Credit | Kapitalkosten | Cost of capital | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Fremdkapital | Debt financing | Kreditgeschäft | Bank lending | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system |
-
Rhodes, Adrienne, (2016)
-
Agency cost of CEO perquisites in bank loan contracts
Chan, Chia-Ying, (2021)
-
Inside debt and the design of corporate debt contracts
Anantharaman, Divya, (2014)
- More ...
-
Does fair value accounting exacerbate the procyclicality of bank lending?
Xie, Biqin, (2016)
-
The 'Out-of-sample' Performance of Long-Run Risk Models
Ferson, Wayne E., (2010)
-
The "Out of Sample" Performance of Long-Run Risk Models
Ferson, Wayne E., (2012)
- More ...