The use of contract adjustments to lengthen the CEO horizon in the presence of internal and external monitoring
Shane S. Dikolli; Susan L. Kulp; Karen L. Sedatole
| Year of publication: |
2013
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Dikolli, Shane S. ; Kulp, Susan L. ; Sedatole, Karen L. |
| Published in: |
Journal of management accounting research : JMAR. - Sarasota, Fla. : Assoc., ISSN 1049-2127, ZDB-ID 1101530-5. - Vol. 25.2013, p. 199-229
|
| Subject: | compensation | contracting | monitoring | forward-looking information | corporate governance | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertrag | Contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010229407