The Validity of the Reform of China’s Corporate Legal Capital Regime : A Law and Economics Analysis of its Creditor Protection Function (公司资本制度改革的正当性: 基于债权人保护功能的法经济学分析)

English Abstract: In late 2013, China revised its legal capital regime, including the abolition of minimal capital requirement, the abolition of statutory valuation procedure, the permission of capital payment by installments without limitation, and the exclusion of paid capital in the registration document. The 2013 reform was intended to reduce the cost of setting up companies, but generated a heated debate on its impact on creditor protection. This paper employs the approach of law and economics to conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the reform, finding that the new creditor protection paradigm brought about by the reform may be more efficient that the pre-reform mechanism. From a view point of institutional economics, the reform is valid in its overall direction and substantive content, which is in conformity with China's reform principle of allowing the market to play a decisive role in resources allocation. But the reform incurs significant costs in the process, particularly indirect costs associated with some disputed issues. It is suggested that those issues be addressed timely and future company law reforms be accompanied by cost-benefit evaluation reports.Chinese Abstract: 我国2013 年公司资本制度改革主要包括取消最低注册资本额，废除法定的验资程序，采用完全认缴规则，工商登记不记载实缴出资等。此次改革的直接动因是降低公司设立成本，改善营商环境，但引发了关于债权人保护问题的激烈争论。对于2013 改革前后债权人保护机制的成本收益分析表明，2013 改革引入了债权人保护机制的新范式，而且比改革前的公司资本制度可能更为有效。从新制度经济学的制度变迁和法律改革理论的角度看，2013 改革在债权人保护方面提供了法律净收益，在方向和内容上具有正当性，符合“让市场在资源配置中起决定性作用”的总体改革精神，但改革过程付出变法成本，特别是由于一些争议问题而导致的间接变法成本，建议及时处理这些问题，以后公司法改革应提供成本收益分析的评估报告。