In multiagent systems, agents often face binary decisions where one seeks to take either the minority or the majority side. Examples are minority and congestion games in general, i.e., situations that require coordination among the agents in order to depict efficient decisions. In minority games such as the El Farol Bar Problem, previous works have shown that agents may reach appropriate levels of coordination, mostly by looking at the history of past decisions. Not many works consider any kind of structure of the social network, i.e., how agents are connected. Moreover, when structure is indeed considered, it assumes some kind of random network with a given, fixed connectivity degree. The present paper departs from the conventional approach in some ways. First, it considers more realistic network topologies, based on preferential attachments. This is especially useful in social networks. Second, the formalism of random Boolean networks is used to help agents to make decisions given their attachments (for example acquaintances). This is coupled with a reinforcement learning mechanism that allows agents to select strategies that are locally and globally efficient. Third, we use agent-based modeling and simulation, a microscopic approach, which allows us to draw conclusions about individuals and/or classes of individuals. Finally, for the sake of illustration we use two different scenarios, namely the El Farol Bar Problem and a binary route choice scenario. With this approach we target systems that adapt dynamically to changes in the environment, including other adaptive decision-makers. Our results using preferential attachments and random Boolean networks are threefold. First we show that an efficient equilibrium can be achieved, provided agents do experimentation. Second, microscopic analysis show that influential agents tend to consider few inputs in their Boolean functions. Third, we have also conducted measurements related to network clustering and centrality that help to see how agents are organized.
