The values of ex-ante and ex-post communication in dictator games

In the dictator game, the recipient’s opportunity to send a message to the dictator increases giving. The effect is equally strong if the message is written before or after the dictator has decided (experiment 1). Recipients have a stronger willingness to pay for ex-ante communication, however (experiment 2).

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Year of publication:	2014-06
Authors:	Langenbach, Pascal
Institutions:	Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Gemeinschaftsgütern, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft
Subject:	communication \| dictator games \| generosity \| laboratory experiment

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 2014_07
Classification:	D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; D64 - Altruism ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781566