The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of games
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Iñarra García, Elena ; Larrea, Maria Concepción ; Saracho, Ana Isabel |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 125.2014, 1, p. 70-73
|
Subject: | Non-cooperative games | von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets | Nash equilibrium | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Erwartungsnutzen | Expected utility | Core |
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