The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information

We provide a simple example demonstrating that the unconditional revelation information in a war of attrition with private budget constraints can decrease expected revenue. Our example suggests that information non-revelation can counteract the adverse revenue impact of budget constraints and almost counterbalance their otherwise negative impact.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Kotowski, Maciej H. ; Li, Fei
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 124.2014, 3, p. 420-423
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	War of attrition \| Budget constraints \| Linkage principle \| Auctions \| Information disclosure \| Contests

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930710