The weak-core of a game in normal form with a continuum of players

Abstract This paper deals with the weak-core of normal form games with a continuum set of players and without side payments. This concept is an approximation of the core introduced by Weber, Shapley and Shubik. The weak-core is slightly larger than Aumann's [alpha]-core when adapted to large anonymous games. A non-emptiness result is obtained based on the well known Scarf's non-vacuity theorem for finite games.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Askoura, Y.
Published in:	Journal of Mathematical Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068. - Vol. 47.2011, 1, p. 43-47
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Weak-core [alpha]-core Game with a continuum of players Large anonymous games Normal form games

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008870854