Theoretical foundations of relational incentive contracts
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Watson, Joel |
Subject: | relational contracts | enforcement | game theory | negotiation | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertrag | Contract | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Rechtsdurchsetzung | Law enforcement | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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