Theory of civil war under asymmetric information
Year of publication: |
2014-07-26
|
---|---|
Authors: | Jellal, Mohamed |
Institutions: | Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
Subject: | Civil Wars | Transfers | Conflict Duration | Asymmetric Information | Rents | Mechanism Design |
Extent: | application/pdf |
---|---|
Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Classification: | C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory |
Source: |
-
Mechanim design and intentions
Bierbrauer, Felix, (2014)
-
Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance
Luz, Vitor Farinha, (2017)
-
Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
Mylovanov, Timofiy, (2012)
- More ...
-
Shaping intergenerational relationships the demonstration effect
Jellal, Mohamed, (2000)
-
Information corruption and optimal law enforcement
Jellal, Mohamed, (2007)
-
On the channels of foreign aid to corruption
Asongu, Simplice A, (2013)
- More ...