Can the threat of economic sanctions ensure the sustainability of international fisheries? : an experiment of a dynamic non-cooperative CPR game with uncertain tipping point
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Jules, Selles ; Sylvain, Bonhommeau ; Patrice, Guillotreau ; Thomas, Vallée |
Published in: |
Environmental and resource economics. - [Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar] : Proquest, ISSN 1573-1502, ZDB-ID 1479788-4. - Vol. 76.2020, 1, p. 153-176
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Subject: | Common-pool resources | Experimental economics | Fisheries management | International fisheries | Policy making | Tipping points | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Fischerei | Fisheries | Fischereipolitik | Fisheries policy | Sanktion | Sanction | Welt | World | Ressourcenökonomik | Resource economics |
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