Tolerance of noncompliance : discretion rather than simple rules?

Álvaro Forteza, Cecilia Noboa

We argue that societies sometimes choose not to enforce the law to gain “flexibility”. Especially developing countries face a dilemma between discretion and commitment to only partially-contingent rules. Rules are good for incentives, but discretion may be more “flexible”. We embed this dilemma in a political model and show that citizens will not support strong enforcement institutions unless the state is able to commit to sufficiently sophisticated redistributive policies.

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Alternative title:	Tolerancia al incumplimiento: ¿discreción en lugar de reglas simples?
Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Forteza, Alvaro ; Noboa, Cecilia
Subject:	Discretion \| commitment \| simple rules \| informality \| enforcement \| Regelbindung versus Diskretion \| Rules versus discretion \| Theorie \| Theory \| Geldpolitik \| Monetary policy