Too much incentive to innovate? : CEO stock option exercise and myopic R&D management
Year of publication: |
2024
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Authors: | Wang, Xinchun |
Published in: |
The journal of product innovation management : an international publication of the Product Development & Management Association. - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1540-5885, ZDB-ID 2012544-6. - Vol. 41.2024, 6, p. 1141-1164
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Subject: | CEO power | firm innovativeness | myopic R&D management | shareholder investment horizon | stock option exercise | Führungskräfte | Managers | Aktienoption | Stock option | Anreiz | Incentives | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Innovation | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Shareholder Value | Shareholder value |
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