Tournaments and contracts under asymmetric information
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gao, Rui ; Wang, Zhewei ; Zhou, Lixue |
Subject: | All pay contests | Asymmetric information | Expected payoff maximization | Heterogeneous abilities | Principal–agent model | Social welfare maximization | Asymmetrische Information | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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