Toward a positive theory of coalition formation and endogenous instrumental choice in global pollution control
Year of publication: |
1998
|
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Authors: | Finus, Michael |
Other Persons: | Rundshagen, Bianca (contributor) |
Published in: |
Public choice. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0048-5829, ZDB-ID 207597-0. - Vol. 96.1998, 1, p. 145-186
|
Subject: | Internationale Umweltpolitik | International environmental policy | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Koalition | Coalition | Umweltstandard | Environmental standard | Umweltabgabe | Environmental charge | Theorie | Theory |
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