Transfer pricing policy for developing countries : an incentive compatible approach
Year of publication: |
[2020]
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bhatia, Devika ; Bansal, Sangeeta |
Publisher: |
[Crawley, WA] : The University of Western Australia, Economics |
Subject: | transfer pricing | game theory | mechanism design | principal agent model | incentive compatibility | Verrechnungspreis | Transfer pricing | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Entwicklungsländer | Developing countries | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Anreiz | Incentives |
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