Trembling Hand Perfection in Repeated Two Stackelberg Leader and Follower

In this paper, we present a two leader-two follower model with repeated play (finitely and infinitely) with trembling hand perfection that is a consistent extension of Stackelberg’s leader-follower duopoly. How the leader-firm can utilize the true reaction curve of the follower-firms with the possibility of mistakes, although the rationality work. We observe the result when one leader-firm produce Nash-Cournot output in finite play and infinite play of the game. And both the leader-firm produces Nash-Cournot output in finite play and infinite play of the game. The Cournot duopoly and the Stackelberg leader-follower models are special cases of this model with trembling hand perfection, the analysis in this paper provides study of the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium solution