Trust and shareholder voting
We test the hypothesis whether a specific aspect of culture – trust in others – affects shareholder voting behavior by substituting for costly monitoring. We find consistent evidence that the percentage of votes cast at shareholder meetings is lower in high-trust countries while the percentage of votes in support of management proposals is higher. Shocks to trust and IV regressions confirm these results. We also find that shareholder voting is more valuable in lowtrust countries, as reflected by a more positive effect on future firm performance, which suggests that managers do not exploit lower levels of monitoring when trust is high.
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Lesmeister, Simon ; Limbach, Peter ; Goergen, Marc |
Publisher: |
Cologne : University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR) |
Subject: | Culture | Monitoring | Shareholder expropriation | Shareholder voting | Trust |
Saved in:
freely available
Series: | CFR Working Paper ; 18-02 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 1048372898 [GVK] hdl:10419/191720 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:cfrwps:1802 [RePEc] |
Classification: | G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance ; G19 - General Financial Markets. Other ; G32 - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011961796