Trust as a signal of a social norm and the hidden costs of incentive schemes
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | Sliwka, Dirk |
Published in: |
The American economic review. - Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Assoc., ISSN 0002-8282, ZDB-ID 203590-X. - Vol. 97.2007, 3, p. 999-1012
|
Subject: | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Soziale Norm | Social norm | Vertrauen | Confidence | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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