Trust, treason, and trials : an example of how the evolution of preferences can be driven by legal institutions

Steffen Huck

Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Huck, Steffen
Published in:	The journal of law, economics, & organization. - Cary, NC [u.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 8756-6222, ZDB-ID 634985-7. - Vol. 14.1998, 1, p. 44-60
Subject:	Rechtsökonomik \| Economic analysis of law \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Evolutionsökonomik \| Evolutionary economics \| Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences \| Kooperation \| Cooperation \| Theorie \| Theory

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