Truth-telling and Trust in Sender-receiver Games with Intervention

Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in strategic information transmission games with conflictive preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator randomly intervenes. We also establish that intervention significantly increases the excessive trust of receivers.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Gurdal, Mehmet Y. ; Ozdogan, Ayca ; Saglam, Ismail
Publisher:	Istanbul : Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum (ERF)
Subject:	Informationsverbreitung \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Theorie \| Strategic information transmission \| truth-telling \| trust, sender-receiver game

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Series:	Working Paper ; 1123
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	669260185 [GVK] hdl:10419/108571 [Handle] RePEc:koc:wpaper:1123 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C90 - Design of Experiments. General ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010500188