Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Lavi, Ron ; Swamy, Chaitanya |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 67.2009, 1, p. 99-124
|
Subject: | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Theorie | Theory |
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