Truthful mechanisms for two-sided markets via prophet inequalities
Year of publication: |
2023
|
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Authors: | Braun, Alexander ; Kesselheim, Thomas |
Published in: |
Mathematics of operations research. - Hanover, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5471, ZDB-ID 2004273-5. - Vol. 48.2023, 4, p. 1959-1986
|
Subject: | bilateral trade | double auctions | mechanism design | prophet inequalities | two-sided markets | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Netzwerkökonomik | Network economics | Marktmechanismus | Market mechanism | Einkommensverteilung | Income distribution |
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