Truthfulness in advertising? : approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders
Year of publication: |
16 October 2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bichler, Martin ; Merting, Sören |
Published in: |
European journal of operational research : EJOR. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0377-2217, ZDB-ID 243003-4. - Vol. 270.2018, 2 (16.10.), p. 775-783
|
Subject: | Multi-agent systems | Auctions/bidding | Approximation mechanisms | Agentenbasierte Modellierung | Agent-based modeling | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Werbung | Advertising | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory |
-
Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders : on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets
Fadaei, Salman, (2017)
-
Rule-based incentive mechanism design for a decentralised collaborative transport network
Lafkihi, Mariam, (2020)
-
Maximally representative allocations for guaranteed delivery advertising campaigns
McAfee, Randolph Preston, (2013)
- More ...
-
Bidding behavior in multi-item auctions - an experimental study
Mayer, Stefan, (2015)
-
It is Time to Auction Slots at Congested Airports
Bichler, Martin, (2021)
-
Randomized Scheduling Mechanisms: Assigning Course Seats in a Fair and Efficient Way
Bichler, Martin, (2021)
- More ...