Two Folk Manipulability Theorems in the General One-to-one Two-sided Matching Markets with Money

We prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem implies two folk theorems, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, and provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem (Demange, 1982, Leonard, 1983, Demange and Gale, 1985).

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Year of publication:	2013-02
Authors:	Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Sotomayor, Marilda
Institutions:	Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)
Subject:	matching \| competitive equilibrium \| optimal competitive equilibrium \| manipulability \| competitive equilibrium mechanism \| competitive equilibrium rule

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 681
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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