TWO FOLK MANIPULABILITY THEOREMS IN TWO-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS

We prove two Folk Theorems which, together with the Non-Manipulability Theorem (Demange (1982) and Leonard (1983)), have stimulated the development of the theory on incentives for the one-to-one two-sided matching models with money as a continuous variable.

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Year of publication:	2012-11-05
Authors:	Sotomayor, Marilda
Institutions:	Departamento de Economia, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade
Subject:	matching \| Stable payoff \| competitive equilibrium payoff \| optimal stable payoff

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers, Department of Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 2012_28
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010875475