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Two-Person Game Forms Guaranteeing the Stability against Commitment and Delaying Tactics.

The notions of the struggle for leadership or for followership, introduced by H. Moulin for two-person games, are considered for game forms. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a game form never to generate a game with the struggle of either kind are derived. Connections between these properties and the existence of a Nash equilibrium for any preference profile as well as the possibility to select a Nash equilibrium in an incentive compatible way are established.
Year of publication:
1995
Authors: Kukushkin, Nikolai S
Published in:
International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 24.1995, 1, p. 37-48
Publisher: Springer
Type of publication: Article
Source:
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005598519
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