Two Types of Collusion in a Model of Hierarchical Agency

We introduce ex-ante collusion whereby the supervisor stops monitoring for a transfer payment from the agent, in addition to ex-post collusion following the monitoring outcome. Extending a well-known model of hierarchy, we study the determinants of ex-ante collusion and show that, depending on the parameter values we identify, the principal can ignore either ex-post or ex-ante collusion.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2005-08-04
Authors:	Bac, Mehmet ; Kucuksenel, Serkan
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	hierarchy \| incentives \| collusion

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - pdf; pages: 18 18 pages
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118551