Undertaking nonharmful or harmful public projects through unit-by-unit contribution : coordination and Pareto efficiency
Ryusuke Shinohara
| Year of publication: |
2020
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Shinohara, Ryusuke |
| Published in: |
Journal of international economic studies. - Tokyo : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 0911-1247, ZDB-ID 1192531-0. - Vol. 34.2020, p. 23-52
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| Subject: | Public project | Unit-by-unit contribution | Pareto efficiency | Strong Nash equilibria | Coaltion-proof Nash equilibria | Pareto-Optimum | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012195222