Uninformative performance signals and forced CEO turnover

Raphael Flepp

Year of publication:	July 2021
Authors:	Flepp, Raphael
Publisher:	Zurich : University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration
Subject:	forced CEO turnover \| board of directors \| informativeness principle \| outcome bias \| regression discontinuity design \| Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Arbeitsmobilität \| Labour mobility \| Corporate Governance \| Corporate governance \| Signalling \| Unternehmenserfolg \| Firm performance \| Managervergütung \| Executive compensation \| Führungswechsel \| Executive turnover \| Board of Directors \| Board of directors \| Regressionsanalyse \| Regression analysis

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