Uninformed Winners Under Adverse Selection

This paper presents a static model of a market for a quality-differentiated good. In one version quality is observable, in the other it is not. It is shown that some agents who are uninformed when quality is unobservable may have higher utility than they do when it is observable. This is more likely to happen when goods of intermediate quality are scarce.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Blouin, Max
Institutions:	Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Économiques et l'Emploi (CIRPÉE)
Subject:	Adverse selection \| uninformed agents

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cahiers de recherche.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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