Uniqueness of the index for Nash equilibria of two-player games

Given a map whose roots are the Nash equilibria of a game, each component of the equilibrium set has an associated index, defined as the local degree of the map. This note shows that for a two-player game, every map with the same roots induces the same index. Moreover, this index agrees with the Shapley index constructed from the Lemke-Howson algorithm.

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Year of publication:	1997-09-16
Authors:	Wilson, Robert ; Govindan, Srihari
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 10.1997, 3, p. 541-549
Publisher:	Springer

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Extent:	application/pdf application/postscript
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: May 30, 1996; revised version June 25, 1996
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596771