Unverifiable Information, Incomplete Contracts, and Renegotiation.
Year of publication: |
1992
|
---|---|
Authors: | Noldeke, G. ; Schmidt, K.M. |
Institutions: | Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) |
Subject: | contracts |
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