Value capture in the face of known and unknown unknowns

Kevin A. Bryan, Michael Ryall, Burkhard C. Schipper

A large theoretical literature on value capture following Brandenburger and Stuart Jr. (1996) uses cooperative games under complete information to study how and why firms earn supernormal profits. However, firms often have different information, beliefs, or creative foresight. We extend value capture theory to incomplete information ("known unknowns") or unawareness ("unknown unknowns"), and illustrate some conceptual issues with that extension. Using the case study of Cirque du Soleil, we show how an entrepreneurial firm can profit even when it does not contribute materially to value creation.

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Year of publication:	[2019]
Authors:	Bryan, Kevin A. ; Ryall, Michael D. ; Schipper, Burkhard
Publisher:	[Davis, CA] : [University of California, Davis, Department of Economics]
Subject:	cooperative games \| unawareness \| incomplete information \| coarse core \| business strategy \| value-capture theory \| Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Kooperatives Spiel \| Cooperative game \| Strategisches Management \| Strategic management \| Core