Verifiable and non-verifiable anonymous mechanisms for regulating a polluting monopolist
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Prieger, James E. ; Sanders, Nicholas J. |
Published in: |
Journal of environmental economics and management : JEEM ; the official journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0095-0696, ZDB-ID 188687-3. - Vol. 64.2012, 3, p. 410-426
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Subject: | Surplus subsidy schemes | Polluting monopolist | Verifiable regulatory mechanisms | Monopol | Monopoly | Regulierung | Regulation | Subvention | Subsidy | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Umweltpolitik | Environmental policy | Umweltbelastung | Pollution | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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