Vertical Integration, Raising Rivals’ Costs and Upstream Collusion
Year of publication: |
2008-08
|
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Authors: | Normann, Hans-Theo |
Institutions: | Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Gemeinschaftsgütern, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft |
Subject: | collusion | foreclosure | raising rivals’ costs | vertical integration |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Number 2008_30 |
Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L23 - Organization of Production ; L40 - Antitrust Policy. General |
Source: |
-
Vertical integration, raising rivals' costs and upstream collusion
Normann, Hans-Theo, (2008)
-
Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure in the Repeated Game
Normann, Hans-Theo, (2004)
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Collusion and downstream entry in a vertically integrated industry
Avenel, Éric, (2012)
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Beckenkamp, Martin, (2009)
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Asymmetric Enforcement of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma
Nikiforakis, Nikos, (2009)
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Leading with(out) Sacrifice? A Public-Goods Experiment with a Super-Additive Player
Glöckner, Andreas, (2009)
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