Vertical integration to avoid contracting with potential competitors : evidence from bankers' banks
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Brickley, James A. ; Linck, James S. ; Smith, Clifford W. |
Published in: |
Journal of financial economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-405X, ZDB-ID 187118-3. - Vol. 105.2012, 1, p. 113-130
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Subject: | Boundaries of the firm | Banking | Economics of organizations | Ownership incentives | Agency theory | Decision authority | Location decisions | Riegle-Neal Act | Community banks | Interstate branching | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Vertikale Integration | Vertical integration | Regionalbank | Regional bank | Bank | Theorie der Unternehmung | Theory of the firm | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Bankrecht | Banking law |
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