Veto players, the kernel of the Shapley value and its characterization

In this article, we provide a new basis for the kernel of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), which is used to construct a new axiom of invariance, and to provide a new axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value. This characterization only invokes marginalistic principles, and does not rely on classical axioms such as symmetry, efficiency or linearity. Moreover, our approach reveals a new instructive role played by veto players.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2014-10
Authors:	Béal, Sylvain ; Rémila, Eric ; Solal, Philippe
Institutions:	Centre de Recherche sur les Stratégies Économiques (CRESE), UFR des Sciences Juridiques, Économiques, Politiques et de Gestion
Subject:	Veto players \| Addition invariance \| Basis \| Kernel \| Shapley value

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 2014-03 9 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010945583