Virtual Repeated Implementation

We show that in the context of repeated implementation, any social choice rule which realizes all alternatives for a positive (yet arbitrarily small) amount of time is Nash implementable. The results complement those of the virtual implementation literature.

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Year of publication:	2003-09
Authors:	Chambers, Christopher P.
Institutions:	California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
Subject:	virtual implementation \| repeated implementation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published: published in Economic Letters 83 (2004) pp. 263-268. Number 1179 7 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005482095