Voluntary Disclosure Programs for Tax Evaders

In this paper, we develop a model that can explain why governments may want to choose to offer a voluntary disclosure program that allows people who withheld taxes to turn themselves in without punishment. We find that such a leniency rule not only increases government revenue when it comes as a surprise, but even when taxpayers anticipate it.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Schmittdiel, Heiner
Publisher:	Amsterdam and Rotterdam : Tinbergen Institute
Subject:	Tax compliance \| voluntary disclosure \| guilt

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Series:	Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; 15-128/VII
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	841210691 [GVK] hdl:10419/125130 [Handle] RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150128 [RePEc]
Classification:	H26 - Tax Evasion ; K34 - Tax Law ; K40 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior. General
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011403587