Voting by Committees under Constraints

We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.

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Year of publication:	2001-02
Authors:	Barberà, Salvador ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro
Institutions:	Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)
Subject:	voting \| strategy-proofness \| additive and separable preferences

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 7
Classification:	D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010773124