Voting methods for director election, monitoring costs, and institutional ownership
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Chung, Kee H. ; Lee, Choonsik |
Published in: |
Journal of banking & finance. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0378-4266, ZDB-ID 752905-3. - Vol. 113.2020, p. 1-17
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Subject: | Director accountability | Institutional investors | Majority voting | Monitoring costs | Institutioneller Investor | Institutional investor | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Theorie | Theory | Kosten | Costs | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Wahl | Election | Vorstand | Executive board | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Wahlsystem | Electoral system |
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