Voting on traffic congestion policy with two levels of government

I study how the political decision process affects urban traffic congestion policy. First, I look at the case of a single government deciding, through majority voting, on a monetary charge to be paid to drive to a city's Central Business District (CBD): if the majority of individuals prefers to drive more (resp. less) than the average, a voting equilibrium with lower (higher) charge emerges. Next, I consider the case of two government levels involved in traffic policy: parking charges in (resp. cordon tolls around) a city's CBD and capacity investments are chosen by a local (resp. regional) government, through a majority voting process. While tax exporting motives and the imperfect coordination among the two governments may lead to higher overall charges than in the case of a single government, strong preferences for driving across the population can still bring to an equilibiurm with suboptimal total charges.